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This Working Paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Corporate 
Governance. Abstract 
Fund managers are the primary investment decision-makers in the stock market, 
and  corporate  executives  are  their  primary  sources  of  information.  Meetings 
between the two are therefore central to stock market investment decisions but are 
surprisingly under-researched. There is little in the academic literature concerning 
their  aims,  content  and  outcomes.  We  report  findings  from  interview  research 
conducted with chief financial officers (CFOs) and investor relations managers 
from FTSE 100 companies and with chief investment officers (CIOs) and fund 
managers (FMs) from large institutional investors. Of particular interest we note 
that FMs place great reliance on discounted cash flow valuation models (despite 
informational asymmetry in favour of CFOs). This leads the former to seek to 
control  encounters  with  the  latter  and  to  place  great  store  on  the  clarity  and 
consistency of corporate messages, ultimately relying on them for purposes other 
than estimating fundamental value. We consider some of the consequences of this 
usage. 
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Introduction 
 
Fund managers (hereafter FMs) are the primary investment decision-makers in the 
stock  market.  Senior  corporate  executives  in  listed  companies  are  the  primary 
source of  information on  which  FMs’ decisions  are  based, and  formal, private 
meetings between these executives and FMs are the primary point of contact. It is 
clear,  therefore,  that  these  meetings  are  central  to  stock  market  investment 
decisions, and so it is perhaps surprising that they are under-researched. While the 
academic literature contains many studies in related areas (‘side-shows’ in effect) - 
such as the share price effects of sell-side analysts’ research or of corporate public 
announcements – there is very little in the literature concerning the aims, content 
and outcomes of formal corporate-fund manager meetings. 
 
This  paper  reports  findings  from  interview  research  conducted  with  Chief 
Financial  Officers  (CFOs)  and  investor  relations  managers  from  FTSE  100 
companies  and  with  Chief  Investment  officers  (CIOs)  and  FMs  from  large 
institutional  investors.  The  objective  of  the  research  and  of  this  paper  is  to 




The corporate-fund manager meeting can be a critical factor in conditioning the 
relationship between a company and its investees. It is part of the investor relations 
(IR) function within a company enabling it, according to the Investor Relations 
Society (2000),  to  present  ‘an  accurate  picture  of  corporate  performance  and 
prospects, thus allowing the investment community, through an informed market, 
to determine a realistic share price.’ Holland (2001) observes that corporates can 
use  four  different  routes  to  manage  the  flow  of  information  to  investors; 
(i) mandatory  public  disclosure,  (ii) voluntary  public  disclosure,  (iii) private 
disclosure and (iv) nondisclosure, and that the third of these is the most important, 
most  corporates  and  institutional  investors  considering  public  disclosures 
‘insufficient’ for their needs (Holland 1998a). A consistent survey finding is that 
fund managers’ meetings with senior management are their most important source 
of information, and that institutions favour regular, private one-to-one meetings 
with corporates above all other means of corporate communication (Gaved 1997; 
Barker 1998;  Marston  1999).  These  meetings  are  frequently  held  around  the 
publication  dates  of  the  annual  and  interim  accounts  and  tend  to  focus  on 
long-term  strategy  rather  than  short-term  earnings  (Golding  2001).  Bence  et 
al. (1995)  and  Barker (1998)  report  that  fund  managers  proactively  seek  novel 
information on the long-term prospects of a company, which contrasts with the sell 
side’s reliance on routinely issued short-term data. 
   2
There  have  been  few  studies  examining  the  overall  effectiveness  of  IR 
programmes.  Theoretically,  as  argued  by  Diamond  and  Verrecchia  (1991), 
increased disclosure ought to increase the liquidity of, and demand for, a firm’s 
securities, so reducing its cost of capital. Later research by Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000) on German companies confirmed that those voluntarily adopting more open 
US GAAP accounting rules did indeed face lower costs of capital. Other papers 
claiming benefits for IR have tended to do so on the basis of analysts’ perceptions 
(Kennedy  and  Wilson 1980),  the  presumption  that  increased  information  will 
inevitably engender long-term investor support (Pound 1993), or by developing 
one of a number of divers theoretical models. Merton (1987), for example, predicts 
that a firm’s cost of capital will be inversely related to the size of its shareholder 
base. Several studies indicate that IR activity may account for temporary changes 
in  trading  patterns  as  a  result  of  increased  market  attention  following,  for 
example, corporate  presentations  (Sundaram  et  al.  1993;  Byrd  et  al.  1995) 
and conference calls to analysts (Frankel et al. 1997). 
 
There is also a large disclosure literature but the majority of it relates to public 
disclosures (Marston and Shrives 1996). A number of researchers have assessed 
the relative importance to investors of such disclosures, finding the profit and loss 
account most highly valued, followed by the cash flow statement, balance sheet, 
chairman’s statement and directors’ reports (Lee and Tweedie 1981; Arnold and 
Mozier  1984;  Day  1986;  Clarke  and  Murray 2000;  Barker  2001)  Prior  to  the 
current US accounting scandals Lev (1999) surveyed various disclosures that exert 
a significant impact on perceptions and market values. These included (i) strategy 
announcements,  such  as  investment  decisions,  (ii) acquisition  programme 
announcements  (on  both  see  Schipper  and  Thompson  1983),  (iii) new  product 
announcements (Chaney et al. 1991), (iv) earnings forecasts (Firth 1976; Maingot 
1984), (v) profits warnings (Skinner 1992; Kasznik and Lev 1995), (vi) dividend 
increases,  (vii) CEO/CFO  commentary  in  annual  report  (Lev  and  Thiagarajan 
1992), (viii) analysts recommendations (Foster 1979), (ix) partial floatations, and 
(x) anti-competitive (deterrent) announcements (Smiley 1988). He noted that the 
impact of disclosure was not limited to share prices and volumes, affecting in 
addition,  share  volatility  and  bid-offer  spreads  (and  thus  stock  liquidity), 
shareholder mix, proxy contests, and the confidence of suppliers, customers and 
competitors. Given the impact of specific disclosures, he points out that the release 
of timely, accurate and relevant corporate information ought to increase allocative 
efficiency.  
 
Of course, the information that is publicly available to investors may not be all that 
they desire. A survey of 508 US analysts found that only half considered existing 
disclosure levels adequate (CPA Journal 1994). They favoured inclusion in annual 
reports and accounts of some verifiable statement on competitive position, industry   3
trends,  long-term  corporate  objectives,  plant  capacity,  dividend  policy,  pricing 
policy, management quality, and sales and eps forecasts, as well as 5 year budget 
estimates.  This  is  broadly  consistent  with  the  findings  of  Epstein  and 
Palepu (1999), that over 85% of US sell-side analysts would like more information 
on risk, liquidity, competition, individual business units and strategy.  
 
Post-Enron, few can resist calls for greater regulation of disclosures. However, the 
extent  and  quality  of  disclosure  is  always  likely  to  have  a  high  element  of 
discretion. In a study of the content of voluntary public disclosure by technology 
companies in conference calls, Tasker (1998) reported that 15% of the questions 
related  to  financial  and  non-financial  data,  about  one  third  to  management’s 
qualitative  observations,  20%  to  management’s  strategic  plans,  and  20%  to 
management’s expectations of future performance. In their study on the efficacy of 
disclosing bad news, Kasznik and Lev (1995) found that half of the managers they 
surveyed preferred to keep silent on large earnings surprises for fear of immediate 
overreaction by investors, although the other half claimed they increased the flow 
of  information,  particularly  harder  quantitative  information,  in  those 
circumstances, fearing the longer-run effects of generating a knowledge gap.  
 
Disclosure  is,  of  course,  not  cost-free.  Conformance  to  a  number  of  different 
standards regimes, principally US GAAP, significantly increases reporting costs 
(Bhushan  and  Lessard 1992).  An  experimental  study  by  Bricker  and 
DeBruine (1993)  examined  the  relationship  between  information  cost  and 
investment risk reduction. They found the quantity of investment and the cost of 
information to be inversely related. Variation in extent and content of disclosures 
may also be related to size, rate of return and/or earnings margin, stockmarket 
listing  (Singhvi  and  Desai  1971),  industry  (Sprouse  1967),  number  or  type  of 
shareholders  (Bushee  and  Noe  2000),  or  the  existence  of  effective  alternative 
monitoring mechanisms such as recognisably independent non-executive directors 
(Leftwich et al. 1981). Malone et al. (1993) tested these empirically by examining 
a  specific  sector,  the  US  oil  and  gas  industry,  and  found  positive  correlations 
between debt/equity ratio, size of shareholder base, and stockmarket listing.  
  
Disclosure  need  not  be  one-way.  Fund  managers  need  not  be  just  passive 
recipients  of  corporate  disclosure  but  can  themselves  provide  information  that 
influences  corporate  strategy.  In  other  words,  they  could  be  active  investors, 
whereby their role is not just independent valuation and investment but is also 
endogenized within their valuation models. The evidence suggests, however, that 
institutions only rarely intervene in investee companies, as they tend to perceive 
the  costs  to  be  greater  than  the  benefits  (Pozen 1994),  so  justifying  a  state  of 
‘rational  ignorance’  (Buchanan  and  Tullock 1962).  But  in  fact,  even  the  most 
activist US institutions spend less than 0.005% pa on interventions (Black 1998).   4
In any case, just a ‘credible threat of voice’ (Kang 2000) may serve to predispose 
managements to focus on enhancing long-term shareholder values, and to discuss 
controversial proposals with their shareholders (Pozen 1994). Others claim more 
tangible benefits from intervention. Hoskisson and Turk (1990) argued that in the 
absence  of  adequate  monitoring  by  shareholders  firms  tended  to  diversify 
excessively, to their detriment, and Parthiban et al. (2001) showed that R&D spend 
increased in targeted companies, an indication that institutional intervention moved 
such companies to focus on long-run returns (see also Baysinger et al. 1991 and 
Graves 1988  on  the  positive  and  negative  effects  of  institutional  ownership  on 
R&D).  In  the  UK  Holland (1998c)  concluded  from  the  case  studies  discussed 
above that ‘core shareholders employed close corporate relationships to identify 
problems,  to  intervene  early,  to  prevent  a  company  from  sliding  into  poor 
performance and to make adjustments at an early stage. This possibility indicated 
that UK financial institutions had developed an early warning system that was 
similar in substance but different in practice to the German lead or Haus Bank’ 
(1998c: 262).  
 
In  summary,  while  the  literature  provides  considerable  evidence  relevant  to 
corporate-fund  manager  meetings,  there  is  very  little  direct  evidence  on  the 
meetings themselves. In particular, there is little evidence on either the motivations 
of FMs and CFOs with respect to the meetings or on the role that the meetings play 




A  defining  characteristic  of  corporate-fund  manager  meetings  is  that  they  are 
private. When coupled with their importance, it is perhaps no surprise that they 
have proved inaccessible to researchers. The research method in this paper is semi-
structured interviews with a representative sample of both parties to the meetings. 
Although inevitably subjective to some degree, this approach allows the researcher 
to get  as  close  as  practical  to the object  of  study,  with the added benefit that 
interviewees  can  articulate  their  views  on  the  aims  of  the  meetings,  including 
whether and when these are met (which would not be directly observable from the 
meetings themselves). Moreover, by interviewing both FMs and CFOs, and by 
asking similar questions of each, some form of additional reliability is given to the 
findings. Finally, a semi-structured approach is suitable to an under-researched 
area,  because  in  contrast  to  a  narrower  approach  of  formulating  and  testing 
hypotheses,  it  enables  the  emergence  of  hypotheses  that  might  not  have  been 
apparent in advance. 
 
The  first  series  of  interviews  was  carried  out  in  mid/late  2002,  with  eighteen 
finance  and  investor  relations  directors  from  fourteen  FTSE100  companies.  A   5
second phase of the research in early/mid 2003 involved interviewing nineteen 
senior managers (chief investment officers, senior fund managers and buy-side 
analysts)  from  eleven  asset  management  companies.  All bar  three of  the  latter 
agreed to recorded interviews. These interviews averaged eighty minutes in length. 
In addition we observed (but were not allowed to record) eight meetings hosted by 
fund managers with CEOs and CFOs of large investee companies. While too few 
in number to provide reliable inference, these meetings nevertheless provided a 
useful ‘reality check’ for the findings from the interviews; they were found to be 
highly consistent and so added additional reassurance.  
 
The interviews were recorded and transcribed. They were then coded into distinct 
themes,  and  the  themes  from  each  of  the  interviews  were  drawn  out  and 
interpreted. The sections that follow report the resulting ‘picture’ that emerged, 
first from the CFOs, then from the FMs and, finally, from an interpretation of the 
aggregated findings. 
 
Evidence from CFOs 
 
When  asked  what  constitutes  a  successful  meeting  with  fund  managers,  most 
CFOs  responded  that  their  primary  objective  was  to  ensure  that  the  FM 
understands the company. The CFO must ask whether the FM understands the 
company’s  strategy,  its  historical  performance  and  its  expected  future 
performance. The CFO must then also ask whether this understanding carries over 
into a well-informed valuation of the company. CFOs cannot view meetings with 
FMs as successful if the understanding they attempt to convey is not ultimately 
reflected in the share price. 
 
Most  CFOs  promote  understanding  by  means  of  repeatedly  delivering  simple, 
understandable,  key  messages,  focused  on  the  strategic  goals  and  performance 
targets of the company. These messages are very carefully formulated. They flow 
directly from Board-level decisions on the company’s strategy. There are distilled 
and  made  simple  because  of  the  perceived  need  to  make  them  understood. 
Extraneous  information  is  controlled  so  as  not  to  distract  from  the  central 
messages, as the following quotes illustrate. 
 
‘You've got to position your company quite clearly and in very, 
very, simple sound bites, very consistently . . . You sit down and 
quite deeply think about the expectations, what are you capable of 
doing, and you package them up into an expectation the City or 
Wall Street can understand.’ 
   6
‘You should never underestimate the need to explain the simple 
stuff to the market. I think if we look back on what we've got 
wrong over the last five years . . . explaining what the market is 
all about and how different it is in America from the UK, and 
what drives it, and who pays for the stuff, and why the growth 
rates are what they are, and what role technology is going to play, 
in a simple way, time and again, relentlessly, is what we should 
have done.’ 
 
The specific messages that CFOs seek to convey will in practice depend upon a 
variety of underlying determinants. For example, if investors are perceived to have 
a  low  level  of  understanding  of  a  particular  business,  then  the  messages  are 
particularly simple and focused, but also much more likely to be supported by an 
information campaign designed to bring investors ‘up to speed’. This campaign 
could involve site visits and dedicated presentations, in addition to time at one-on-
one meetings. A need to ‘educate’ investors in this way can arise for a number of 
reasons,  for  example:  when  there  is  significant  M&A  activity;  when  overseas 
investors take an initial interest in the company and they are not familiar with it; 
when new technology creates a market or business model that investors do not 
understand; when the company is followed by sector-specific analysts and one or 
more of their businesses falls outside the analysts’ sector expertise. For example, 
the following quote illustrates a communication strategy following a major merger.  
 
‘It was important for us to make sure that we could explain, in the 
beginning, the coherence of our business strategy. Now in almost 
100%  of  cases  it's  questions  and  answers  because  people 
understand well enough what the company is about.’ 
 
A further determinant of messages to FMs is the current stage of the company’s 
economic cycle. For a given period of time the messages might be focused on 
recovery  strategies,  perhaps  involving  cost-cutting  and  the  disposal  of  under-
performing  assets.  Over  time,  the  messages  might  then  be  expected  to  evolve 
towards,  for  example,  strategies  for  meeting  targets  for  growth  and  margin 
expansion. The following quote illustrates this.  
 
‘We're in a position where the market has given us a big tick for 
recovering the business and therefore there is a lot of credibility 
and credit to the management team for that, and therefore . . . I 
know when we go into the City this time, there will be a lot of 
questions on, “Well, what next?”’   7
 
In designing the appropriate messages for FMs, CFOs have in mind an implicit 
understanding of the fund mangers’ approach to valuation. Valuation models are 
generally perceived to comprise only a short period (typically not longer than two 
years)  of  detailed  forecasts,  followed  by  a  relatively  subjective  estimation  of 
longer term performance and terminal value. The information that CFOs convey is 
therefore of two types. The first is detailed and relatively objective information 
relating to historical financial performance and short term financial forecasts. The 
second relates to the estimation of longer term performance and terminal value and 
is higher level, wider ranging and less precise. The difference between these two 
types of information is of great importance, as the following quotes illustrate. 
 
‘Who’s to say what's the right share price? . . . I think what you're 
doing therefore is sort of making sure that certainly within the 
forecast  and  numbers  over  the  next  two  years  you're  working 
really hard.’ 
 
‘Provided the information in the market as regarding our financial 
performance is not miles out of line, as far as we're concerned, 
that is our obligation to explain to the market. How people want 
to use that to determine a price, we think that's entirely up to the 
market, nothing to do with us.’ 
 
There was a general perception that CFOs have, in effect, an obligation to explain 
clearly historical and near-term performance, but that beyond this they can at best 
only provide qualified and uncertain information. Alternatively stated, relatively 
objective information must be communicated reliably, consistently and accurately, 
but beyond this the CFO’s information is as good as it can be but is issued with a 
caveat emptor. 
 
There were mixed views about the validity of the relatively uncertain, longer term 
information. Some  CFOs took the view that models of future performance are 
necessarily and reasonably driven by assumptions relating to a few key parameters, 
implying  that  the  communications  role  of  the  CFO  is  to  channel  appropriate 
messages relating to these parameters. For example,   
 
‘We, probably like most companies, [have] no more than a dozen 
things  that  really  influence  the  company's  value  over  the  mid 
term.’ 
   8
On the other hand, several CFOs were less sanguine. They expressed scepticism 
about the market’s ability to estimate terminal value. In their view, although the 
market might well have reliable information relating to short term, forecastable 
performance, the FMs were perceived to be inherently limited in their ability to 
model longer term business performance. This was because of the lack of reliable 
data and also because of the lack of in-depth business knowledge required to make 
such projections. The following quotes illustrate these views. 
  
‘I  think that  they do  build  fairly  accurate  short-term  sales  and 
profit models looking at a couple of years, but thereafter, I don’t 
know what we are doing in three years time, so nor do they.’ 
 
‘To  them  it's  just  like  well,  you've  bought  your  machine,  you 
switch it on, profits go up, and as long as you guys don't screw it 
up it will go on up forever.’ 
 
‘Unless you tell them very explicitly, they will tend to model that 
almost into perpetuity.’ 
 
If FMS rely on CFOs for information and guidance concerning future business 
performance, and if information about the future is uncertain and subjective, then 
the  credibility  of  the  CFO  as  an  information  provider  assumes  considerable 
importance.  In  other  words,  the  use  that  FMs  choose  to  make  of  information 
supplied  by  a  given  CFO  will  depend  upon  the  extent  to  which  the  CFO  is 
regarded as trustworthy and well-informed.  
 
Accordingly,  CFOs  go  to  great  lengths  to  ensure  that  any  given  message  is 
delivered  consistently,  by  different  people  within  the  company  and  across 
meetings with different groups of FMs, both at a given point in time and over time. 
One CFO made this point succinctly, as follows. 
 
 ‘The basic message has to be consistent, whatever the audience.’ 
 
It is of great importance to be consistent over time. For example, once a CFO has 
committed to a message regarding future performance, such as the effects of a 
restructuring or the expected market share from a new product, then FMs will 
monitor for a considerable period to see whether the company actually delivers 
against the expectation it has created. One way to help ensure message consistency 
is to manage carefully the level of disclosure in order to manage and possibly 
minimize  this  scrutiny.  CFOs  also  generally  prefer  to  keep  the  news  flow   9
conservative.  In  effect,  this  amounts  to  retaining  some  slack  and  to  avoiding 
possible  inflation  of  the  share  price.  There  will  always  be  some  inherent 
uncertainty in expected business performance, and conservatism allows scope to 
absorb bad news while leaving open the possibility of positive surprises. Above all 
is the avoiding of bad news, because nothing damages trust more than delivering a 
loss having promised a profit. Several CFOs echoed the following comment. 
 
‘It’s very, very clear that institutions will distrust the companies a 
lot once they fail to deliver on a promise.’ 
 
If the CFO is credible and trustworthy, then FMs are more likely to be willing 
investors.  Indeed,  the  issue  of  trust  can  transcend  that  of  valuation-relevant 
information itself. In the presence of uncertainty about the future, FMs need not 
have reliable information about expected future performance if, instead, they can 
rely on trustworthy management. Viewed in this way, the issue of trust does not so 
much affect FM’s valuations directly (for example, through the discount rates that 
they apply) as it affects the FM’ willingness to invest. This is illustrated by the 
following quote. 
 
‘I don't know what the plans are in detail yet, I can't put them in 
my model, [but] these guys clearly know what they're doing, what 
they tell me sounds sensible . . . I trust that they are going to 
deliver on that . . . and that’s clearly going to be keeping the p/e 
up, if nothing else, with events, or up where it is.’ 
 
In the absence of trust, and thereby in the absence of a willingness to invest, a 
company’s  investment  plans  might  go  unfunded  through  a  lack  of  shareholder 
support. It is almost incidental whether or not the investment plans are expected to 
generate positive net present value. The expectation is unavoidably uncertain, and 
it is dominated in the FMs’ minds by an over-riding unwillingness to invest, as the 
following quotes illustrate. 
 
‘We  earn  that  right  (to  make  investment  choices)  through 
shareholders being confident in our ability to deliver what we say 
we are going to deliver. You can't perpetually say, ‘Don't worry 
it's all going to come in the future,’ if you’ve got no track record.’ 
 
‘Are we looking at large acquisitions at the moment? No. Why 
not, we haven’t earned the right. We spent a lot of money on 
acquisitions two\three years ago. It caused huge problems . . . We   10
have not earned the right to make acquisitions. Lets say we are a 
year hence from now and we believe that we’ve started to earn 
that right, our ratios are all pretty good and we believe there’s a 
value enhancing acquisition, I’ll make up a number, half a billion 
pounds, how would we approach that? We would have to start to 
test the water and start to send feelers out that we are thinking 
about these things, because you couldn’t suddenly just do it, we 
wouldn’t have acceptance.’ 
 
It is therefore of great importance to CFOs to understand FMs’ willingness to 
invest. This is especially true when the implementation of the company’s strategy 
requires the FMs’ support.
1 For example, the CFO will use meetings with investors 
to determine the likely market reaction to significant corporate activity. Frequently 
cited examples were the likely stock market reaction to a proposed merger, IPO, or 
debt issue. In each of these examples, if FM support is absent, then the CFO has no 
option  but  to  shelve  the  strategy  and  to  work  instead  on  building  trust  and, 
eventually thereby, the ‘right’ to execute the strategy in due course. 
 
Generally,  there  was  a  perceived  need  to  understand  the  investment 
philosophy/house style of any given FM. If, for example, successful delivery of 
corporate  strategy  leads  the  company  beyond  being  attractive  for  a  value  or  a 
growth investor, then demand for the company’s stock is likely to fall away unless 
investor relations activities are directed towards a new set of investors. Likewise, 
unless the company is sure that it has a significant number of investors who will 
tolerate a decline in share price, or has identified potential investors who would be 
willing to buy on signs of share price weakness, it faces potentially a steep decline 
in share price. In effect, issues such as these amount to the company understanding 
the demand curve for its own stock. An objective of investor relations is to know 
who will buy, sell and hold at what price, and to manage the portfolio of investor 
meetings (and so the shareholder base) accordingly. This is especially important 
because  of  a  perception  that  the  turnover  in  a  company’s  shares  can  be  high. 
Although most CFOs described their ideal investor is one who holds reliably for 
the long term, it was acknowledged that such an ideal could not be relied upon. As 
one CFO put it, 
 
‘You’ve got to keep stimulating demand because you are going to 
get churned.’ 
 
The  FMs’  willingness  to  invest  is  enhanced  to  the  extent  that  the  CFOs 
communicate their knowledge of the FM to others in the company. These others 
must be made to understand which investment strategies the market will accept   11
and why, as well understanding how and why the actions of those within the firm 
affect the FMs’ level of trust and willingness to invest. As one CFO put it: 
 
‘What good IR (investor relations) becomes is almost the voice of 
the investor, but inside the business.’ 
 
Evidence from Fund Managers 
 
All  FMs,  at  any  point  in  time,  have  an  established  set  of  views  about  the 
companies in which they are invested. These views form the backdrop and the 
agenda for company meetings. The FM uses the meetings to test whether or not his 
or her views are correct, or whether they need to be revised.
2 These views form the 
justification for the investment. Typically, the FMs describes them in the form of 
‘value drivers’ – primary determinants of the value of the company’s equity. By so 
doing, they make explicit the link between the views and the investment case. The 
following quotes from three of the FMs illustrate this approach.  
 
‘The way our investment process works, is you first figure out the 
value drivers. ‘Is this a good or bad company.’ We are actually 
fairly explicit in saying good or bad company is measured along 3 
criteria, the ability to return a profit over your cost of capital, the 
ability to grow the business, and risk surrounding this forecast.’ 
 
‘We have a research process and framework that every analyst 
operates under. When they are analysing a company they are all 
using the same framework. We look at the fundamentals of the 
business  which  is  basically  what  sort  of  industry  does  the 
company  operate  in,  how  consolidated,  how  competitive,  etc., 
what is the company position within the industry, is it a strong no. 
1 or a weak no 4 etc. etc., how historically has the management of 
the  company  performed  and  what  is  their  strategy  given  the 
industry and their position in the industry.’ 
 
‘You characterise  a company.  You  say, I  understand, this  is  a 
steady  return  business.  It  gets  returns  a  bit  above  the  cost  of 
capital. You build a picture of a company like that so a good 
meeting is something that helps you understand whether you are 
on  the  right  track  or  not.  A  bad  meeting  is  where  you  go  in 
thinking that you have got this picture of the company and come 
out and the picture is fuzzier.’   12
 
In some cases, the description of the FM’s valuation methodology was clear and 
explicit, while in other cases it was imprecise. Different FMs tended to described 
their overall approaches to valuation and investment somewhat differently. Indeed, 
most went further and regarded their own particular approach (or, more broadly, 
their ‘investment philosophy’) as a source of competitive advantage. In spite of 
this,  however,  there  were  very  considerable  commonalities  in  the  types  of 
information that FMs seek to support their investment analyses. In all cases, there 
were  looking  for  reassurance that they  ‘understood’  the  company  and  for  new 
information that caused them to revise and update their views. A meeting could be 
satisfactory if it simply confirmed prior views. It could be successful if it provided 
that extra bit of information and insight, for example allowing greater confidence 
in  a  central  forecasting  assumption.  However,  a  meeting  would  generally  be 
considered unsuccessful if it generated too much noise – i.e. if it caused the FM to 
revise his or her views to the point at which they began to question the validity of 
their model or of the underlying assumption. The FM does not want to emerge 
from the meeting unsure of the value of the investment and unclear what to do 
about it. The following quotes illustrate these points. 
 
‘A successful meeting is when you can look at your investment 
thesis and say the meeting helped me reinforce my view or is 
making me rethink my view.’ 
 
‘Generally these are always update, reassurance meetings, in the 
main.’ 
 
‘We always want to make sure that companies in which we invest 
have a sensible strategy that we understand, and they understand.’ 
 
‘At the majority of the company meetings, it is important that this 
isn’t just a single one off meeting, it is part of a series of meetings 
which we as long term investors will be having with the company 
in which we are invested. It’s about changes as much as anything. 
It’s to check that there is consistency of message or if there isn’t 
consistency of message there is an explanation as to why things 
have changed.’ 
 
The FMs’ need to provide data for their models or, more generally, to increase 
their level of confidence in their projections, leads to the FMs wanting to control 
the  agenda  for  the  meetings.  They  do  not  wish  the  company  to  talk  about   13
something that is already understood. Neither do they want to spend their limited 
time on areas not relevant to the primary value drivers. Rather, they want to take 
the opportunity to complete the gaps in their models, and to test and probe the 
company on issues that the FM feels the need to understand better. The following 
view was typical. 
  
‘One of the things we don’t do is let companies present to us. 
That  they  come  with  a  one  size  fits  all  presentation  is  the 
problem.’ 
 
The need to provide reassurance in the investment position is typically satisfied by 
regular  meetings,  held  once  or  twice  per  year  after  the  announcement  of  the 
company’s results. However, there can be occasions when additional meetings are 
required.  These  arise  when  there  is  a  shock  to  the  system  –  something  that 
threatens the FM’s confidence in the investment position, something that makes 
him  or  her  feel  that  the  company  is  no  longer  understood.  This  could  be  a 
significant event, such as a takeover or the departure of top executives, or else 
unexpected changes in market conditions. One FM described the motivation for ad 
hoc meetings in the following way. 
  
‘We have if you like a sort of base position in every company so 
we know where we are positioned, what our recommendation is 
and what the key drivers are behind that. The ad hoc meetings 
tend come about because there is something in the key drivers 
that has changed or we think there is something in the industry or 
whatever, and therefore we need to verify that position and just 
check that our base position is as we perceived it to be.’ 
 
Although relatively infrequent, ad hoc meetings can be particularly important in 
the FM’s relationship with a company. This is because they are more likely to 
provide an opportunity for FMs to play an active role, in contrast to the more 
typical role of being passive recipients of information. Consider the following 
 
‘We have 5 questions that all major investment decisions must 
answer, what are the key drivers for that asset stock or whatever? 
What’s  changing?  What’s  in  the  price,  which  is  kind  of  the 
analysis? Why will the market change it’s mind, which is actually 
the difficult bit, and then what’s the trigger, because we want to 
be pro-active investors. So, once we’ve got the first 4 questions, 
we identify a trigger . . . So some of the stuff at the company 
meetings might be focussing on understanding what’s changing   14
some of the key drivers, some of the stuff might be understanding 
what happens next, some of the meetings might be us trying to 
ensure that the trigger we want to see is pulled.’ 
 
To the extent that ad hoc meetings arise at stress points in a company’s life, and at 
times perhaps when the support of FMs is required, the opportunity to ‘pull the 
trigger’ is greater. If the valuation is sensitive to the trigger, and if the FM has a 
significant holding, then the payoff to such an approach can also be significant. In 
general, though, most FMs conceded that their influence is small, both by choice 
and by circumstance. By choice because most FMs did not consider that their role 
could  or  should  be  to  manage  the  company.  By  circumstance  because  they 
invariably  have  little  or  no  effective  means  of  enforcing  their  will.  A  typical 
approach to influencing corporate strategy is based necessarily upon persuasion 
and argument rather than upon direct control, as the following quote illustrates. 
 
‘I think the first action is to give it a go. I find these easy issues to 
address.  I  say,  ‘Look,  actually  this  business  looks  as  if  it’s  a 
millstone. Why don’t you sell it or can’t you sell it?’ I think get 
that message across. There comes a point where you can sense in 
their  statements  and  behaviour  whether  they  are  receiving  that 
message and are thinking about it or not.’ 
 
When there is an impasse and management is not ‘receiving the message’ then the 
FM has little option but to sell stock. Ideally, however, the relationship between 
the FM and the company is closer than this.  
 
‘I think once you establish a relationship with a company and you 
have  proven  to  them  as  an  investor  that  you  understand  the 
company and the issues, then the meetings move to a different 
level. This doesn’t happen overnight. It’s something that can take 
a couple of years to get into this situation. But I have been sat 
opposite management teams who’ve told me things not overtly, 
and  you  have  to  work  it  out  and  you  have  to  ask  the  right 
question, and if you do you push on doors, you actually you find 
out things about the way they’re thinking about the business. And 
that deep relationship does take a lot of time to establish. That 
sort of relationship can be very, very rewarding.’ 
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A generally-held view was that meeting the management was vital, ideally as a 
way of building an effective working relationship, but also sometimes as a means 
of making investment decision-relevant judgements and of signalling alarm bells. 
 
‘Just thinking through the company meetings that I have attended 
over the years, the key thing is there is no substitute for sitting 
across the table from somebody.’ 
 
‘Some companies are always too optimistic, it’s as simple as that, 
and  you  must  be  aware  of  that.  Other  people  are  naturally 
cautious, but a lot of the, ‘That’s guy’s good, that guy isn’t good,’ 
is experience. I normally see 3 or 4 companies a week and have 
done for a long time and therefore a lot of that is experience. That 
guy’s not answering the question. He should be able to answer 
that question. He’s trying to avoid that question. That guy’s really 
sharp. He knows what he’s doing, his point by point comment.’ 
 
‘My experience tells me that this company is stuffed full of serial 
optimists who when it comes to the day of telling the city what’s 
going  on,  they  got  it  wrong.  They  have  no  concept  of 
understanding what expectations are out there, and managing the 
business against the expectations that they have set.’ 
 
‘I have seen situations where . . . (we) come out of a meeting and 
sit down on the basis of a 10 minute conversation and we would 
decide to halve the holding or to get out altogether because we 
knew  enough  or  we  had  heard  enough  to  know  that  as  the 
company went around with this particular message and strategy 
the shares were only going one way. And I can spot today in the 
market  place  when  the  company,  having  published  its  figures, 
then starts to see investors.’ 
 
In support of the assessment of management made during one-on-one meetings, 
FMs employ additional information sources. For example, the credibility of the 
management’s message is affected by the evidence of financial performance in 
previous years and by the ability of the management to control information flow 
against market expectations. 
 
‘I think there’s still a tendency on the part of companies to think 
that if something is a bit bad, by the time you have to report your   16
results it would have gone away . . . And genuinely there are 
times when the management didn’t realise, which is probably the 
most worrying aspect. The reason you had a profit warning is that 
they had no clue themselves, and that is when you absolutely hit 
the panic button.’ 
 
‘Well I would say if it is a cyclical business, why have you never 
had an annual profit statement in the last 10 years which has been 
free  of  provision  of  one  sort  or  another,  and  why  do  the 
cumulative provisions that you have taken over the last 10 years 
account for 1.5 times the value of the company as it stands today. 
I would say the past record doesn’t suggest that there have been 
good times and bad times; it suggests that there have been bad 
times and bad times.’ 
 
Interpretation and Conclusions 
 
Valuation is usually understood in the context of the discounted cash flow (DCF) 
model. The DCF model can be summarised briefly as follows. First, the user of the 
model must forecast the future cash flows attributable to the asset in question. 
Second, the user must select an appropriate discount rate to express those cash 
flows in terms of their present value (PV). Third, investment activity is value-
creating if the cost of an investment, expressed as a PV, exceeds the PV of the 
expected  cash  inflows.  Alternatively  stated,  there  is  positive  net  present  value 
(NPV) if the internal rate of return on an investment (IRR) exceeds the cost of 
capital.  Fourth,  PVs  are  additive.  The  PVs  of  individual  shareholdings  in  a 
company sum to the PV of the company’s total equity, and the sum of total equity 
for all listed companies equals the value of the stock market.  
 
The  theory  of  efficient  markets  can  be  laid  over  the  DCF  model  in  order  to 
characterise  the  role  of  the  CFO.  Stock  market  prices  are  semi-strong  form 
efficient if  they impound  publicly available  information.  They  are  strong  form 
efficient  if  they  also  impound  privately  available  information.  If  the  CFO  is 
viewed as the holder of private information, and the FMs as the users of public 
information, then the effectiveness of the CFO in investor communications could 
be measured in terms of the gap between semi-strong and strong form share prices. 
 
The evidence presented in this paper can be set against this (briefly described) 
theoretical framework. Consider first the forecasting of future cash flows. It is 
striking  that  the  CFOs  (i.e.  the  holders  of  private,  presumably  superior 
information)  are  seemingly  less  confident  than  the  FMs  about  their  ability  to   17
predict future performance. The CFOs characterise their role as providing simple 
and understandable messages, and they seem to recognise the inherent limitations 
of  the  resulting  dataset.  In  contrast,  the  FMs  seem  to  interpret  this  data  as 
providing the essence of their valuation models, which in turn generate usable 
estimates of value. The CFOs do not place great weight on information relating to 
periods beyond short-term forecasts. The FMs contrast this with claims regarding 
their own ‘investment philosophies’ and their ability to understand relative value. 
The contrast between the knowledge base of the CFO and the FM is all the more 
striking when one considers that the former is immersed in the company and the 
latter can only afford the company as much attention as its size in the portfolio 
deserves.  This  was  illustrated  starkly  by  one  FM  who,  relatively  unusually, 
manages funds passively and meets companies only infrequently. 
 
‘What you get is the Chief Executive and the Investor Relations 
person and maybe the Finance Director, and they’re on some City 
PR offensive and literally you’ve got an hour, they’re seeing six 
firms in a day . . . they’re talking about something that they know 
a hell of a lot about and you don’t. Assuming that they’re pretty 
good in the first place, its going to be pretty unusual where you 
trip them up on something that is their specialist subject, and it’s 
not yours.’ 
 
In this context, the FMs contrast the CFOs in two ways. First, they have only 
limited time  and  resources  available to value  the  company. Second,  they  must 
generate an ostensible valuation that they feel they can support, because without it 
they have no credible basis for portfolio investment decisions. The combination of 
these factors makes a relatively simple valuation model attractive to FMs, and it 
explains  a  focus  on  simple,  understandable  value  drivers.  The  depth  and 
complexity of information familiar to the CFO would be unwelcome to the FM.  
 
Within the CFO-FM relationship, the concept of risk is captured inadequately by a 
theoretical framework where cash flows are discounted to their PV. If the range of 
possible future cash flows is too subjective and uncertain to attract meaningful 
probability distributions, and if this difficulty is compounded by the ‘informational 
risk’ that CFOs are more or less reliable providers of information, then there is 
little scope for precise adjustments to discount rates. The concept discussed earlier 
of  ‘willingness  to  invest’  describes  a  practical  means  of  dealing  with  risk.  In 
contrast  to  the  standard  DCF  model,  investments  are  not  routinely  supported 
whenever the IRR exceeds the cost of capital, because the IRR is not knowable 
with sufficient reliability. Rather, a company is supported if it inspires confidence. 
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These conclusions are consistent with the theoretical framework proposed by the 
economist George Shackle, whose work challenges the application of probability 
theory  to  decision  making  under  uncertainty.  It  is  in  the  nature  of  investment 
decisions, he argues, that circumstances are always different; the logic of repeated 
experiment, text-book probability games, where the parameters of the problem are 
known  for  certain,  simply  does  not  apply  -  ‘knowledge  and  uncertainty  are 
mutually  exclusive  …  objective,  actuarial  probability  has  no  relevance  for  the 
analysis  of  decision  in  the  face  of  uncertainty,  because  when  objective 
probabilities can be applied there is no uncertainty.’ (Shackle 1961). Instead, he 
proposes that decision-makers first rule out what they consider beyond the realm 
of possibility, leaving a (possibly wide) range of plausible outcomes. Within this 
range, Shackle (1955) defines a ‘potential surprise’ function, which is central to his 
model  of  decision-making  behaviour.  Potential  surprise,  y,  is  a  function  of 
potential investment gain, x, as estimated by the decision-maker at the time of the 
investment decision. The potential surprise function can be illustrated as follows. 
 






When y(x)=0, there would be no surprise arising from the realised value of x. 
When y(x)=y*, the value of x is beyond the realm of possibility, as judged by the 
decision-maker. For values of x where y*>y(x)>0, greater or lesser outcomes for x 
would be increasingly surprising, yet still plausible. The narrower the distribution 
of y(x), the narrower the range of outcomes envisaged by the investor and so the 
more certain is the feeling he or she has about the outcome of the investment. 
Viewed  against  this  model,  the  FM’s  aim  is  to  narrow  the  distribution  of  the 
potential surprise function. This is evident in both desire to plug the gaps in the 
valuation model (so capturing variables that influence outcomes) and to ensure the 
trustworthiness of investee management (so giving confidence in the veracity of 
input data). If the distribution cannot be narrowed sufficiently, then the range of 
plausible outcomes is too wide, with the result that the FM becomes unwilling to 
invest.  Shackle (1955)  notes  that  if  news  (i.e.  information)  ‘seems  to  provide 
internally inconsistent or conflicting evidence … or is for any reason difficult to 
interpret, the consequence would be to inhibit some kinds of business activity; not   19
because the news was regarded as bad … but because it is unintelligible.’ This 
outcome arises either when the business is not understood (hence the demand for 
simple,  consistent  messages  from  CFOs  about  the  business  model)  or  when 
management has lost credibility, so making the range of plausible outcomes seem 
wider from the FM’s perspective (hence the high penalty for CFOs who inflict a 
negative surprise – a widening of the distribution – on the unsuspecting FM).  
 
A practical consequence is that whenever a company needs the support of FMs, for 
example  when  new  investment  requires  new  equity,  the  FMs  have  a  direct 
influence on investment decisions. It might be noted, however, that this influence 
need not be of great consequence in the grander scheme of things. If a company 
has the support of its investors, then it can fund investments whether or not they 
add  value.  And  even  if  the  company  is  not  supported,  it  can  still  pursue  its 
investment  strategy  independently  just  so  long  as  it  can  provide  funding  from 
internal cash flows. In any event, if trust is built on past performance, then there is 
limited reason to suppose it is an effective guide to future performance. 
 
Following on from the notion of FMs’ willingness to invest is the observation that 
CFOs cultivate liquidity and support for their stock, by means of understanding the 
demand curves for different FMs and designing the investor relations programme 
accordingly.  It  is  the  subjectivity  and  uncertainty  of  valuation  that  allows  the 
possibility of different FMs having significantly different views on the value of the 
company. The better a company is at understanding its FMs and ‘placing’ its stock 
accordingly,  the  greater  support  there  will  be  for  its  share  price.  This  is 
independent of the intrinsic value of the company. Hence, rather than viewing the 
PV of the company as simply the sum of the PVs of individual shareholdings, a 
more  sophisticated  picture  takes  into  account  the  identity  of  the  shareholders. 
Moreover, and following similar reasoning, the multiplicity of FMs’ ‘investment 
philosophies’ is made possible because of uncertainty in valuation. One cannot 
tell, a priori, whether any given investment philosophy is likely to outperform any 
other. Given that relative performance is fundamental to FMs, if all adopt the same 
investment philosophy, then they are less likely to convince themselves or others 
that relative performance is achievable. Hence the uncertainty-induced opportunity 
for choice translates into a variety of investment philosophies in practice.   20
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